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Oral Presentation 1.1 
OF "MICE" AND MEN 
A CRITICISM OF JERRY FODOR'S THEORY OF MENTAL CONTENT 
C.J. Summers, Leonard Clapp, Department of Philosophy, IWU 
Jerry Fodor is currently one of the top philosophers of mind. One of his main 
projects is the attempt to naturalize the intentionality of our mental states. 
Intentionality is roughly cashed out in terms of belief/desire psychology, the 
theory that humans have beliefs and desires with semantic content or 
meaning, and that these beliefs and desires are more or less the cause of their 
actions. The supposition that our mental states have meaning seems in 
tension with a physicalist ontology, which includes only natural, syntactic 
objects. It is unclear how neurons or chemicals can have meaning in the way 
that our mental states appear to be meaningful. Fodor attempts to provide an 
account of the Intentionality of our mental states which reduces this meaning 
to purely physical, syntactic entities. If he were successful then he could 
retain a belief in intentional mental content while remaining a strict 
physicalist. 
The two tools which are available to a physicalist are physical objects and 
relationships between physical obj ects. Fodor constructs a theory which 
equates the meaning of a mental state with the causal relationships it bears 
to obj ects in the world. His theory, however, does not succeed as an 
explanation of meaning because it fails to distinguish meaningful situations 
from non-meaningful. It therefore falls to pansemanticism, the assignment of 
meaning to objects, such as smoke, which obviously are not meaningful in the 
same way as our mental states. Furthermore, given the complexity of 
relationships in the non-meaningful world it appears likely that a 
pansemantic counter-example win exist for any theory which attempts to 
reduce meaning to relationships. 
